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Federal Civil Jurisdiction of Military Justice
Chester B. Gynn, Jr.*
C ONTROL EXERCISED by the federal civil courts over courts-
martial differs from that found in other types of cases in-
volving the relation of federal and state courts. The federal civil
courts are constitutional courts; the military courts are adminis-
trative courts established by Congress and empowered by the
Constitution; while state courts receive their power from en-
tirely different sovereigns. Thus, to determine the powers of
review which federal civil courts have over courts-martial, refer-
ence must be made almost exclusively to cases involving courts-
martial. Few analogies can be inferred from the ordinary federal-
state decisions.
The Constitution of the United States' empowers Congress
to make rules for the government of, and to regulate, the land and
naval forces of the United States. By the Act of 5 May 1950,2 the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Congress unified, consolidated,
revised and codified the Articles of War, the Articles for the
Government of the Navy, and the disciplinary laws of the Coast
Guard. Article 76 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice3
states:
The appellate review of records of trial provided by this
code, the proceedings, findings, and sentences of courts-
martial as approved, reviewed, or affirmed as required by
this code, and all dismissals and discharges carried into
execution pursuant to sentences by courts-martial following
approval, review, or affirmation as required by this code,
shall be final and conclusive, and orders publishing the pro-
ceedings of courts-martial and all action taken pursuant to
such proceedings shall be binding upon all courts, depart-
ments, agencies, and officers of the United States, subject
only to action upon a petition for a new trial as provided in
article 73 and to action by the Secretary of a Department as
provided in article 74, and the authority of the President.
From this and similar provisions under previous enactments
dealing with military justice, it is apparent that the Supreme
* A third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School, and a graduate
of Case Institute of Technology.
1 Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 14.
2 Public Law 506, 81st Congress, c. 169, s. 1, 64 Stat. 108; Title 50, U. S. C.
(Chap. 22), Secs. 551-736.
3 Title 50, U. S. C., Sec. 663.
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Court has no power to review the action of military tribunals.
This was pointed out in an appeal by a civilian of a conviction
resulting from a trial before a military commission during the
Civil War. This was the case of Ex parte Valladigham,4 where
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Wayne it was declared:
... the court cannot, without disregarding its frequent deci-
sions and interpretations of the Constitution in respect to its
judicial power, originate a writ of certiorari to review or
pronounce any opinions upon the proceedings of a military
commission.
The passage of over one hundred years found the Supreme
Court maintaining the same position. In an appeal 5 by an enemy
combatant, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, from a conviction
rendered by a military tribunal, the Supreme Court stated:
... it must be recognized throughout that the military tri-
bunals which Congress has sanctioned by the Articles of
War are not courts whose rulings and judgments are made
subject to review by this Court.
Although the above cases, strictly speaking, were not appeals
from a court-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
the same general rule applies to courts-martial, as pointed out
in the case of Carter v. Roberts.6
Courts-martial are lawful tribunals, with authority to finally
determine any case over which they have jurisdiction, and
their proceedings, when confirmed as provided, are not open
to review by civil tribunals....
It is obvious from the foregoing that the proceedings, deter-
minations of law and fact, and sentences of courts-martial, are
not open to direct review or attack in the Supreme Court, nor
in the inferior federal courts. This is not to say that the results
of a court-martial are absolutely final and binding. They can be
collaterally attacked, as was pointed out in Givens v. Zerbst,7
where it was said that:
... courts-martial are tribunals of special and limited juris-
diction whose judgments are always open to collateral at-
tack.
The courts construe Article 76 of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice strictly. While they rule that it prevents direct at-
4 Ex parte Valladigham, 1 Wall. 243, 17 L. Ed. 589 (1864).
5 Application of Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1, 66 S. Ct. 340, 90 L. Ed. 499 (1946).
o Carter v. Roberts, 177 U. S. 496, 20 S. Ct. 713, 44 L. Ed. 861 (1900).
7 Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U. S. 11, 41 S. Ct. 227, 65 L. Ed. 475 (1921).
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tack on courts-martial, they do not go so far as to say that it
prohibits the jurisdiction of a federal civil court in determining
the right of a petitioner in a hearing on a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. The method of collateral attack is by a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus from a federal civil court.
8
Before the petitioner can avail himself of habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, he must exhaust all his remedies in the courts-martial
system regarding appeals, motions for new trial, etc. In Gusik v.
Schilder,9 the court in its opinion stated:
. . . the District Court would not have been justified in en-
tertaining the petition unless the remedy afforded by the
Article10 had first been exhausted .... Such a principle of
judicial administration is in no sense a suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus. It is merely a deferment of resort to
the writ until other corrective procedures are shown to be
futile.
This position has been followed by the federal courts, as in
Osborne v. Swope," where the court required military remedies
to be exhausted. Although these remedies were barred by the
statute of limitations, the court would not allow the writ, since
the petitioner did not avail himself of the remedies when he
had the opportunity.
The historical approach to collateral attack relates to the
courts-martial "jurisdiction." Areas into which the federal civil
courts will inquire, under "jurisdiction," include: whether the
court was properly constituted, whether it had jurisdiction over
the person and the offense, and whether it had exceeded its
power in imposing sentence. This position was held by the
Supreme Court as late as 1950. In Hiatt v. Brown,12 the court
emphatically stated:
The Court of Appeals also concluded that certain errors
committed by the military and review authorities had de-
prived respondent of due process. We think the court was
in error in extending its review, for the purpose of deter-
mining compliance with the due process clause, to such
matters as the propositions of law set forth in the staff judge
8 On habeas corpus proceedings in a state court, the state court has no
authority to order discharge of a person held under U. S. authority. Ex parte
McMillan, 15 Ala. App. 571, 74 S. 396 (1917).
9 Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128, 71 S. Ct. 149, 95 L. Ed. 146 (1950).
10 Article 53 of the Articles of War. (These Articles were superseded by
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.)
11 Osborne v. Swope, 230 F. 2d 395 (C. C. A. 9, 1956).
12 Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U. S. 103, 70 S. Ct. 495, 94 L. Ed. 691 (1950); rehear-
ing denied 339 U. S. 939, 70 S. Ct. 672, 94 L. Ed. 1356.
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advocate's report, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the respondent's conviction, the adequacy of the pretrial
investigation, and the competency of the law member and
defense counsel .... It is well settled that by habeas corpus
the civil courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power
over the proceedings of a court-martial * * *. The single
inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. In re Gumley (1890),
137 U. S. 147, 150; 11 S. C. 54, 34 L. Ed. 636. In this case the
court-martial had jurisdiction of the person accused and the
offense charged, and acted within its lawful powers. The
correction of any errors it may have committed is for the
military authorities which are alone authorized to review
its decision.
Matters which are properly the subject of inquiry by a fed-
eral civil court, as collected in 15 A. L. R. 2d 389-407, follow.
The courts will inquire whether a court-martial had juris-
diction over the accused-for instance, whether the accused was
ever inducted into the armed forces. The composition of the
court-martial, with regard to numbers and rank, is a subject of
inquiry; but prejudice or enmity of a court member appears not
to be a ground. The lack of qualifications of the trial advocate
was considered to be a procedural error, not subject to review,
as was his presence at a closed session of the court. Comments
of a trial judge advocate are not subject to a review, although
a comment in a closing argument regarding the accused's failure
to make a sworn statement was held to be a denial of due process.
The courts will discharge a prisoner when it appears that his
counsel was so incompetent as to preclude due process of law to
the accused. The legality of the sentence is a proper subject for
review, but there is conflict as to whether severity of the sen-
tence is a proper subject. Double jeopardy-that is, trial for a
crime against federal, non-military, law and later before a courts-
martial-has been held to be a subject for inquiry, although
there are decisions to the contrary. Illegal search and seizure
have been held to be proper subjects for inquiry; while the suf-
ficiency of pleadings or the sufficiency of the evidence normally
has been held not to be such. Matters which the courts say are
not proper subjects include the credibility of witnesses, the ad-
missibility of evidence, confession or admission of accused, the
applicability of the statute of limitations, and the record of trial.
As was pointed out previously, the federal civil courts historically
and traditionally will inquire only into the jurisdiction of the
court-martial in an habeas corpus proceeding.
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From the previous listing of factors which are the proper
subject of inquiry by a federal civil court, the reader will notice
that some collateral attacks on courts-martial are made on
grounds difficult to reconcile with the "jurisdiction only" rule.
In 1953 the case of Burns v. Wilson' s arose, in which the
Supreme Court extended the "jurisdiction only doctrine" to em-
brace the position that the invasion of the accused's constitu-
tional rights is a proper subject of inquiry by the federal civil
courts. Because of the change of position indicated by this
decision, it is well to consider the circumstances of the case.
Here three members of the armed forces were accused, tried,
and convicted of rape and murder. Two were sentenced to
death, the other to life imprisonment. The two who had been
sentenced to death brought habeas corpus proceedings based on
a number of serious allegations against the authorities, the cumu-
lative effect of which, if true, would be to depict fundamental un-
fairness which would refuse them the constitutional guarantee
of due process. It is important to note that here the court was
not inquiring into jurisdiction, but into due process. In the
majority opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, with Justices Reed,
Burton, Clark joining, stated:
The military courts, like the state courts, have the same re-
sponsibilities as do the federal courts to protect a person
from a violation of his constitutional rights. In military
habeas corpus cases, even more than in state habeas corpus
cases, it would be in disregard of the statutory scheme if the
federal civil courts failed to take account of the prior pro-
ceedings--of the fair determinations of the military tribunals
after all military remedies have been exhausted. Congress
has provided that these determinations are "final" and
"binding" upon all courts. We have held that this does not
displace the civil courts' jurisdiction over an application for
habeas corpus from the military prisoner. . . But these
provisions do mean that when a military decision has dealt
fairly with an allegation raised in an application, it is not
open to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply to re-
evaluate the evidence.
The court then went on to show that the military appeals courts
had evaluated these claims fairly-the review was legally ade-
quate-and the court denied the writ. Mr. Justice Jackson con-
curred in the result. In a separate concurring opinion Mr. Justice
Frankfurter declared:
13 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 73 S. Ct. 1045, 95 L. U!l. 1508 (1953);
rehearing denied 346 U. S. 844, 74 S. Ct. 3, 98 L. Ed. 363.
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... if imprisonment is the result of a denial of due process,
it may be challeged no matter under what authority of Gov-
ernment it was brought about.
Mr. Justice Minton, in a second concurring opinion, stated that
the federal civil courts have one function- "... to see that the
military court has jurisdiction."
The dissenting opinion was given by Mr. Justice Douglas,
with Mr. Justice Black concurring:
Of course the military trials are not governed by the pro-
cedure for trials prescribed in the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments.... Nor do the courts sit in review of the weight of
evidence before a military tribunal .... But never have we
held that all the rights covered by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments were abrogated by Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 14 of the
Constitution, empowering Congress to make rules for the
armed forces. I think it plain from the text of the Fifth
Amendment that the position is untenable. The Fifth
Amendment provides: "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a pre-
sentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when
in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."
What reason is there for making one specific exception
for cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the militia
if none of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to military
trials? Since the requirement for indictment before trial is
the only provision of the Fifth Amendment made inappli-
cable to military trials, it seems to me clear that the other
relevant requirements of the Fifth Amendment . . . are
applicable to them.
It is interesting to note that only one of the majority opin-
ions upheld the historical concept. The others, as well as the
minority opinion, considered the subject of due process and the
constitutional rights of the accused.
Inferior court interpretations of the Burns case have ranged
from a limited conservative construction to a broad liberal view.
In Easly v. Hunter,14 the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth
Circuit, stated:
14 Easly v. Hunter, 209 F. 2d 483 (C. C. A. 10, 1953).
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. as we understand the Burns decision, it does no more
than hold that a military court must consider questions re-
lating to the guarantees afforded an accused by the Con-
stitution and when this is done, the civil courts will not
review its action.
The Easly interpretation of the Burns case was quoted and ap-
proved in Suttles v. Davis,15 by the same court of appeals.
A liberal interpretation of the Burns case occurred in De-
Coster v. Madigan,16 where the Court of Appeals, in releasing
the prisoner on a writ of habeas corpus, stated:
... a civilian court may look into only the elementary mat-
ters of a court-martial's jurisdiction of the person accused
and the offense charged and its power to impose the sentence
awarded.... Several recent cases, however, appear to have
expanded the scope of review slightly, or at least, to have
shifted the emphasis from mere "jurisdiction" and "power"
as the proper subject for a civilian court review to broader
considerations of the "fullness" and "fundamental fairness"
of the court-martial proceedings.
However, in Jackson v. Taylor,17 a case with substantially
the same facts as the DeCoster case, the court, although stating
it would not decide on the propriety of the habeas corpus pro-
ceedings, went ahead to consider the prisoner's petition. The
decision was adverse to the petitioner.
Some other recent federal civil cases, decided since Burns v.
Wilson, are briefly presented, since they indicate the courts'
attitude regarding the proper subject of inquiry in an habeas
corpus proceeding. White v. Humprey'8 considered the denial of
due process to the prisoner. In Mitchell v. Swope19 the issues
were denial to the prisoner of due process and his rights under
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. Bourchier
v. Van Metre2 0 was a case where the court considered jurisdic-
tion, matters of a constitutional nature, and due process, and
concluded:
... we cannot say that the military tribunals have failed to
deal fully and fairly with appellant's contentions and when
we so conclude, our limited function is exhausted.
15 Suttles v. Davis, 215 F. 2d 760 (C. C. A. 10, 1954).
16 De Coster v. Madigan, 223 F. 2d 906 (C. C. A. 7, 1955).
17 Jackson v. Taylor, 234 F. 2d 611 (C. C. A. 3, 1956).
18 White v. Humprey, 212 F. 2d 503 (C. C. A. 3, 1954).
19 Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F. 2d 365 (C. C. A. 9, 1955).
20 Bourchier v. Van Metre, 223 F. 2d 646 (C. C. A., D. C., 1955).
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The question of denial of any basic right guaranteed by the
Constitution arose in Day v. Davis,21 where the conclusion was
that there was no such denial. The courts still refuse to consider
the sufficiency of the evidence, as is shown by the recent case of
Wilson v. Wilkinson,22 where the court said:
. . . even if it were inclined to disagree with the verdict,
could not consider this question in habeas corpus. This
Court is without power to try such issue de novo.
In summary, it can be said that the federal civil courts do
not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the decisions of
courts-martial. Indirect review is possible through the accused's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, although the accused must
exhaust his remedies within the courts-martial, system before
the federal courts will consider this petition.23 Historically, the
jurisdiction of a court-martial has always been a proper subject
for inquiry. Recent cases have indicated an enlargement of this
concept. Now, consideration of denial of constitutional rights to
the accused, including denial of due process or fundamental
fairness, are also subjects of inquiry. These areas are presently
being defined and interpreted by the federal civil courts, with
the result that here the law, as in many other subjects, is in a
state of flux. Its development should prove interesting.
21 Day v. Davis, 235 F. 2d 379 (C. C. A. 10, 1956).
22 Wilson v. Wilkinson, 129 F. Supp. 324 (D. C., Penna., 1955).
23 Michaelson v. Herren, 137 N. Y. L. J. (71) 1 (decided Mar. 17, 1957; re-
ported Apr. 12, 1957), C. A. 2, S. D. N. Y.
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